
Understand why CIPA lawsuits are rising and how to minimize privacy risk on your website.
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On May 8, 2026, the California Attorney General announced that General Motors (GM) has agreed to pay $12.75 million to settle allegations that it illegally collected and sold driving and location data from hundreds of thousands of OnStar subscribers.
That makes it the largest California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) settlement in history; previously, the largest CCPA penalty was $2.75M, handed down to Disney in February 2026. But the size of the penalty is not the most important part.
The real story is what California regulators tested: whether GM could justify why sensitive driving data was still retained, why it was later sold to data brokers for insurance risk scoring, and why that actual data flow contradicted what consumers were told.
That matters far beyond connected vehicles. The GM case is the first regulatory action enforcing CCPA’s data minimization requirement.
For privacy and legal teams, the question is no longer just whether the policy says the right thing. It’s whether data processing evidence can prove that the data was collected, retained, shared, and deleted for the right reasons under CCPA.
GM's OnStar platform collected a remarkable amount of data from connected vehicles: GPS coordinates, hard braking events, rapid acceleration, speed threshold crossings, seat belt usage, late-night driving patterns, and trip duration. All of this data was generated as a byproduct of providing emergency assistance, navigation, and crash response services.
In 2020, GM began selling that data to two data brokers, LexisNexis Risk Solutions and Verisk Analytics. Both companies then used the data to build insurance risk scoring products. This continued until 2024. According to the California Attorney General (AG)'s complaint, GM's own privacy notices stated explicitly that it would not sell driving or location data.
GM’s actual data flows said otherwise.
Investigators found that GM had retained consumers’ driving and location data long after it was needed to operate OnStar services. Then, the company monetized that retained data.
This is a direct violation of the CCPA's data minimization and purpose limitation requirements, which were added to CCPA as part of the 2023 California Privacy Rights Act amendment.
The settlement requires GM to:
GM also has to build out a strong privacy compliance program and submit regular assessments to CalPrivacy, the California Department of Justice, and several California district attorneys.
There have been significant CCPA actions before this. Most of them tested a pretty basic set of questions:
These questions are important, to be sure, but they’re also quite narrow.
The GM case is different in scope. It's the first CCPA action to specifically enforce data minimization requirements. This reveals that regulators are actually changing what they’re testing.
The GM case doesn't just ask whether you disclosed the data use correctly. It asks whether the data use was proportionate and purposeful in the first place. It asks whether you can prove that with technical evidence, not just policy language.
For most privacy teams, that is a materially harder question to answer.
The GM complaint is built around what we’ll call four types of drift. Each one has a direct parallel in how data programs fail inside real companies.
Data collected for one legitimate purpose, like emergency assistance, navigation, or crash detection, was later used for something the original collection never considered: sale to data brokers. The complaint found that this purpose was never disclosed to consumers. Once data gets collected for purpose A, using it for purpose B violates CCPA.
GM reportedly began collecting driving and location data in 2016. The data sales to LexisNexis and Verisk didn't start until 2020. That four-year gap is the violation in miniature: data that should have been deleted because the operational need had passed was instead sitting in storage. This kept it available to be monetized later. The data didn't have to be improperly shared immediately. It just had to exist past its purpose.
GM's privacy notices told subscribers their data wouldn't be sold. The actual data flows proved otherwise. When regulators compared the published policy against their third-party data flows, the gap between statement and reality became evidence of the violation.
We can assume that GM had a privacy governance infrastructure: vendor contracts, internal review processes, and a privacy team, for starters. At no point did the infrastructure catch or stop these violations. That's a structural observation: privacy governance that operates at the policy and documentation layer, without any visibility into what's happening in production, will miss exactly these kinds of failures. Yes, the program existed, but the data privacy practices drifted anyway.
These four types of drift aren’t unique to automotive companies. They happen anywhere that data is collected at scale for one purpose and then ages into a system where business incentives create pressure to use it differently.